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[L, A. No. 20312. In Bank. July 1, 1948.1

HARRIS STICKEL. Itespondent, v. SAN DIEGO ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY (a Corporation) et ai.,
Appellants.
[1] Appeal-Review-lDcompetent Evidence.-OpiDion testimony
given by a plaintiff without a motion having been made to
strik(' it may be considered by an appellate court in support
of a "erdict in his favor.
[2] Automobile&-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an
automobile collision case in which the employe's admission
was l'eceived in evidence against him and his employer without objection, the failure to give an instruction that the evidence was not binding on the employer did not prejudice him
where a finding of the operator's negligence was supported,
since any negligence OD his part was imputed to the employer.
[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 804; 3 Am.Jur. 380.
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 970; [2] AutolIIouiles, ~a85-1; [3] Automobiles, §223; [4] Automobiles, 1258;
15J Trial, §77(3); [6] Witnesses, 1222;'[7] Automobiles, 1202;
[8] Witnesses, § 249; [9] Witnesses, § 91; [10] Appeal and Error,
~ 1088; [11] Appeal and EITor, § 1612; (12] Negligence, § 188;
11:i] 4'1ltomohiles, § 385-4; [14] Automobiles, § 385-14; [15] Auto' .. ohiles, § 327; [16] Automobiles, § 32'J-l; [17] Automobiles,
~ 385-7; [18] Automobiles, § 318; [19] Automobiles, 1386-23;
[20J New Trial, 1169(3).
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[3] Id. - Evidence - Collisions - At Intersections.-In an action
against a bus company and its employe arising out of an intersection collision at ui/Z"ht, evidence that the car in which
the plaintiff was riding stopped at the intersection before proceeding into it, that the bus driver sounded no warning and
that he admitted that he did not see the other car until after
it was struck, supported an inference that the driver's negligent failure to watch for traffic crossing the street was the
legal cause of the collisiol..
[4] Id. - Evidence-Contributory Negligence-Vehicles Crossing.
-In an action arising out of a collision of a bus with an automobile at night, evidence that the automobile driver stopped
at a through highway, looked to the right, shifted gears, and
drove into the intersection; and that plaintiff, who was a
passenger in the automobile, saw "bright lights in front of our
cab and that is the last thing I remember" did not establish
as a matter of law that the automobile driver failed to yield
the right of way as required by Vch. Code, § 552, and that such
negligence contributed to cause the accident.
[6] Trial-Introduction of Evidence-01fer of Evidence.-In an
automohile and bus collision case, the court properly refused
to permit proof of intoxication of the passenger and driver of
the automobile where defendants made a mere general offer of
proof without producing a witness or stating the evidence
whereby such intoxication was to be proved and without asking
a question of any witness concerning such evidence.
[6] Witnesses - Impeachment - Use of Assumed Name.-Where
there is no real dispute as to the identity or true name of a
plaintiff, evidence is inadmissible to show that he had used
other names and had been arrested on various charges and
convicted of misdemeanors under such names.
[7]

Autom~biles-Evidence-Admissibility.-In

an automobile collision case, the trial court properly sustained an objection to
evidence that a police officer at the scene of the accident entered in his notebook the notation that an automobile rlln
through a stop sign, since such a notation was but fin opinion
of the officer arrived at from interviewing unidentified persons.

[8J Witnesses - Impeachment - Inconsistent Statements.-In an
automobile and bus collision ease, a notlltion made by an officer
at the scene of the accident as to the cause of the accident
was not admissible to impellcb his testimony as to an admission of the bus driver, wbere the notation was not a record
of a statement by the driver.
[9] Id,-Examination of Witnesses-Extent.-In a wJ'ongful dentn
and personal injury action, defendants wel'e not improperly

!
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curtail~d

in the examination of their wiLne!:>!:> where it appcarcd
thllt, after the sustaining of objections to several leading IIUC:;tions and th(' striking of SOIll(, answers of the witness, defl'ndants abandoned their line of inquiry and .. eased to elicit further testimony from him.

[10) Appeal- Persons Entitled to Allege Error - Estoppel. - A
party cannot compluin of the admission of evidence where, at
the time it was offered, he stated that he had no objection to
its receipt.
[11] ld.-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-A party cannot complain of the refusal to admit a statement to rehabilitate a witness where it is subsequently admitted at the instance
of the opposite party, irrespective of the stated purpose of its
admission.
[12] Negligence - Instructions - Assumption as to Conduct of
Others.-An instruction substantially to the effect that one
may not continue to assume that the law is being observed
after knowing or having an opportunity, by the exercise of
reasonable care, to know that it is not being observed, is not
subject to the objection that it might be misunderstood as
imposing a duty to anticipate the negligence of others.
[13] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an
automobile collision cue, an instruction that "It is the duty
of the driver or operator of any kind of vehicle using a public
highway to exercise ordinary care at all times to avoid placing
himself or others in danger and to avoid a collision," although
.ubject to the criticism that it might be understood as imposing
the absolute duty "to avoid a collision," was not ground for
reversal where it was apparent from the verdict that the jury
did not so understand it.
(14] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error - Instructions. - In an automobile collision ease, defendants were not prejudiced by
the refusal of an instruction as to the negligence of plaintiff in
riding with an intoxicated driver where plaintiff could not
have been contributively negligent in riding with a driver who,
as the jury impliedly found, was not legally responsible for
causing the collision.

I

/

[15] ld. - Instructions-Oonduct of Driven at IntersectioDS.-In
an action arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection in a through highway, it. was proper to refuse an instruo~on that it was immaterial which vehicle entered the inter8Cction first, where the lI.e,ligence of the respective driven
waa at issue.
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[16J Id.-Instructfons-Speed.··-In an automobile collision case,
it WII~ pr"p!')' to r('fm-a' 1111 in~t I'II<'tioll that t.he lawful "pe('d
limit fOT a vehif'le at th(' intersection Will! 25 mill's per hour
unles!I "it has bN'n c1f'1lrl.v proverJ that such speed ... was
greater than was reasonable or prudent for a person operating
a vehicle ... at th(' time and place of th(' accident, having
due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of the
highway, and the fact that the street. . was an arterial, or
through highway, but in no event at a speed which endangers
the safety of persons or prop('rty." sinc!' lIuch instruction was
an incomplete,-inisleading and grammatically peculiar attempt
to atate the codified speed laws. (Veh. Code, §§ 510, 511, 513.)
[17] Id. -Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Speed.-In an
action arit;ing out of a collision of vehicles at a street intersection, the failure to instruct as to prima facie speed limit at
the intersection was Dot pre.iudicial to defendant where it did
not app!'ar thnt the jury would have been aided in their deliberation or probably would have reaf'he: a diiIerem result
if it had heen giv('n.
[18] Id.-Instructions-Driving Whlle lntoxicated.-In an action
arising out of a collision of' vehicles, it was proper to refuse
an instruction as to the criminal responsibility of' an intoxicated driver.
[19J Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions. - In an action
arising out of a collisioIl of vehil')(,s. thl' failure to give an
instruction specifically directed to drunken driving as negligence did not in the circumstances prejudice defendants where
the jury were adequately instructed in general terms as to
negligence, contributory negli~(>nl'e and proximnt(' cause.
[20] New Trial-AJlidavits-As to Misconduct of J1lI')'.-Affidavits
in support of a motion for new trial on the ground of the misconduct of the jury are insufficient where they are made on
information and belief or where they concern a juror in another ease who is not shown to be a juror in the present case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County from a verdict, and from an order denying a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Joe L. Shell, Judge.
Judgment and order affirmerl; appeal from verdict dismissed.
Action for damages for wrongful death and for personal
injuries resulting from a collision of vehicles. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmE'd.
Huntington P. Bledsoe for Appellants.
Edgar B. HervE'Y and Henry F. Walker for Respondent.
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SCH.A VER, .1.-·- Plailltiff Harris Stickel sued to recover
damages for th., d,.ath of hi" wife and for his own personal
injuries rCRulting from a collision betwccn a bus of defendant
railway company driven by defendant Amos, its employe,
and a piekup truck in whieh plaintiff was a passenger and
whieh WIlS being driven by Mrs. Stickel. Defendants appt'al
from a judgment pursuant to a jury verdict for plaintiff and
from an order denying their motion for judgment notwith·
standing the verdict. We have concluded that their many
claims of error do not justify a reversal.
The accident occurred at about 10 :40 p. m. at the intersection of Twelfth and K Streets in the city of San Diego. The
bus was proceeding south 011 Twelfth Street. According to
defendant Amos its speed was hetween 22 and 24 miles an
hour. Mrs. Stickel was driving west on K Street. The following evidence supports the verdict: Mrs. Stickel stopped at
the cast curb line of the intersection. looked to her right,
shifted gears, and drove into the intersection. She did not
look to her right again. The truck was nearly across the intersection, traveling approximately 6 and Dot more than 12
miles an hour, when Mr. Stickel, who had not been" paying
much attention" to traffic, "looked around and there were
bright lights in front of our cab and that is the last thing I
remember"; Mrs. Stickel "must ha,'e seen it [the bus] because she tried to step on the gas." ([1] There was no motion
to strike this opinion testimony of plaintiff; therefore it is
to be considered in support of the verdict. 2 Cal.Jur. § 473,
p. 804.) The bus driver sounded 110 warning. The left front
of the bus struck the right door of the cab of the trucl!. The
force of the impact was snch that the bus pllsherl the truck
nearly 170 feet from the point of impact. Two police officers
arrived at the scene of the accident about 10 minutes after the
collision. Shortly thereafter Amos. the bus driver. told them
that "he did not see the Chevrolet rplaintiff's pickup truck]
at all until after he hit it .... until he felt the gl88S in his
face." ([2] This admission b;v Amos was received in evidcnce as against both defendants without objection. Defendants' objection to other evidencp of Amos' admission, on the
ground that it was "1H'llrsay," was "sustained as to the
def~ndant . . . Railway Company and overruled as to the
defendant Amos," but there was no request that the jury
be instrnctecl that the evidpller was not binding on the railway eomp:1ll.\'. In any event t he Jack of such instrllction
sa c.2d.....

)
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coulu not hu\'c prejudicrrl ,lcfcndant company because the
finding tllat Amos was n(>gli~!'nt Jnw;t be upheld, and any
nceligencc of Amos is imputed to the rOll1pany.)
[3] Tllc eviu('JlcC above sU1I1Jllari;::ed is sufficient to support
lin inference that Amos' negligent failure to watch for traffic
crossing Twelfth Strcet was the legal cause of the co1lil'ion.
[4] It docs 11ot, as defend nuts urge, e~tablish as a matter of
law that Mrs. Stickel negligently failed to yield the right of
way as required by section 552 of the Yehicle Codc and that
such neglip,encc contributed to cause the accident. Section
552 provides, "The driVer of any vehicle which has stopped
as required by this code at the entrnnce to a through highway
shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from the throug-h highway or which are
approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded
Illay proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approae~ing
the intersection on the throu~h hir,hway shall yield the right
of way to the vehicle so about to enter or cross the through
highway." The jury could have decided that when Mrs.
Stickel started across the interseetion she reasonably believed
that the bus was not an immediate hazard.
[5] Defendants introduced midcnce tending to show that
both Mr. and Mrs. Stickel were intoxicated at the time of the
accident. This evidence consists of t('stimony that the Stickels
were in a barroom about half an hour before the accident, that
Mrs. Stickel was then obviously intoxicated and Mr. Stickel
was drinking, and that after the a('cincnt the odor of alcohol
was on the breaths of Mr. and Mrs. Stickel. The evidence was
introduced in support of the pleaded defenses that negligcnce
of Mrs. Stickel proximatcly contributed to cause the accident and that plaintiff himself was negligent in riding with
Mrs. Stickel when he knew or should have known that she
was intoxicated and could not and would not drive with due
care. Plaintiff testified on cross-examination that neither he
nor his wife was in the above mentioned barroom on the day
or night of the collision. He was not asked whether he or
Mrs. Stickel was intoxicated or had bcen drinking prior to
the accident. Defendants complain that the trial court refused to permit them to introduce other evidence which, they
claim, would have tended to show that plaintiff and his wife
were intoxicated at. the time of the accident. In this respect,
the record shows, defendants at no time made a proper offer
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of admissible evidence; after several colloquies as to the sufficiency of defendants' vague offers of proof and the admissibility of certain evidence which defendants suggested they
wished to offer,· the trial court said, "1 am not convinced that
the offer of proof, or the cross-examination indicated, is proper.
. . . We will reserve that matter for argument"; and defendants never again made an offer of proof, sought to argue. or
asked a question of any witness concerning such evidence. ., A
mere general offer of proof without producing the witness
or stating the evidence whereby the fact in issue is to be

)
J

/

)

·Such colloquies were in material part as follows:
"Mr. Bledsoe [counsel for defendant]: .•. 1 want to refer to
numerous arrests [of nlaintift'J, particularly in this City of drunkl.'nne~~
and drunk driving ..
"The Court: If you are able to prove, or if you wish to make inquiry
as to whether or not he bad been drinking shortly prior to this occur·
renee, in an effort to establish his capacity for obsE'rvation at the time
this took place, I would say yes, but whether he had been drinking a
week before or had been arrested 50 times before for drunktmn~lI~,
unless it is connected up with the physi('lll condition st the time of the
occurrence, I don't think it is impeachment.
"Mr. Bledsoe: He [plaintiff] says he was not drinking on this ni~ht
and never drinks. [Plaintiff hila not so testified and was not therenfter
asked whether he had been drinking on the nijht Of. the accident or
whether he had ever drunk intoxicating liquor.j I can show what he
says is not true. . ..
"Mr. Hervey [counsel for plaintiff]: Whether he ever drinks or not
does not mn ke any difference .
.. The Court: I think that is correet. If you have authorities for any
of thos!' contentions J want to hear them, but in the absE'nce of any
Ruthority I am relying on my general ideas of materiality. . . .
"Mr. Hervey: . . . It is entirely immaterial whether he drank or not
on Rn~· other occasiolls. . . .
"[Thereupon the noon recess was taken. Thereafter the following
colloquy was had: J
"~Ir. Bledsoe: He say8 in thE' dE:'pollition that he does not drink.
[There is no evidence to this effect in the record.) I would then have
to ask him some questions, to lay a fonndation for impeachment, whiclJ
WOlll~ be as to th,· number of times he has been arrested for drunk
(lriving, disorderly (·onduet, and the fact that he does drink and ha~
hecn seen nightly in different hars in an intoxicated condition. I want
to RRk the questionR hefoye the jury if they are proper. . . •
"The Court: You ('.an make your oft'er of proof now and we will
d,-fer ruling on it unti! tomorrow . . . .
":\1 f. Bledsoe rmade and there was discussion as to offers of proof
rOJlc·eruillg matters other than intoxication.) ..•
"The Court: What about this offer to prove the use of intoxicants.
:\lr. Hen'ev!
"Mr. ITervey: I certainly oujeet to that . . . I would prefer that
YOllr. Honor di(1 not indicate in the record that your Honor woul<:l
sustain Ull ohjection to something unless it has "een statec1 definitely
What it i~ I!oin~ to be.
.. If COllnsel will definitely state what he
would asl; t-he witness then ) would Iik,- to siat,> any o!>j(,,-tiOllH 1
might have and your Honor may then rule on it if your Honor sees
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proved, or, if the witness be present, without putting a question to him in such form as to give opportunity for objection,
is not correct trial procedure and it affords no ground for
appeal. rCitations.]" (Douillard v. Woodd (1942), 20 Cal.
2d 665,670 (128 P.2d 6].)
[6] Defendants complain that •• The court refused to permit the witness Stickel to be impeached in regard to his
identity and to thE' date and fact of his marriage to deceaRed."
But defendants do not claim that plaintiff is not thE' man
who sustained the injury in question and their answer admits that at the time of the accident deceased was the wife

)

fit, but I don't think counsel ought to simply expect your Honor to role
on a proposition like this when eounsel makes a statement that be
would attempt . . . to prove that he drinks . . . . Counsel might ask
thiA question of the witness: Had von been drinking that day or bad
your wife been drinking that day-but if counsel :Deans J-y bis offer that
he would seek to prove this man'8 habit of using ..ntoxicating liquors
at other and unrelated times and oeeasions • . . . J would objet't on
the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterIal and upon
the ground that it was an attempt to i.lJ:.peaeh the witness upon an
immaterial matter.
":M r. Bledsoe: The purpose in making the offer was to ahow . . .
that prior to the date of the accident that plaintiff. Harris Stickel, and
Essie Stickel. deceased, were addieted to t.he use of intoxicating liquors
in exees! and ad been for some period of time prior thereto, for a period
of years, and that 'he witness. when he states as hE' did in his deposition
that be does not drink, is not telling the troth; that the use of intoxicating liquors to tht enent the witnes!les I unidentified J would stllte
would, of course, be material as to the habits. .
"The Court: Then you wish to develop a continuous course of ex·
cessive use of int.oxicating liquor' That is what ;'our final objeetive is'
"Mr. Bledsoe: That is it . . .
.. The Court:. . You didn't ask hln [plamtifl') the impeaching
question which might lay the foundation.
"Mr. Bledsoe: t haven't asked anything.
"The Court: Lt>t us hear eXRetly what you want to ask.
I I Mr. Bledsoe: I wRnt to ask him. first, does he drink at any time.
If he indieated in the deposition • I don't drink very much, I take a
beer o('.cRsioually' t am Rssuming that that is what he is going to
testify to here. Then I would like to ask him a question to IllY the foundation to impeach him, to call bartenders, and so forth, to say that what
he testified to on the stand is not true. This is prior to the date of the
aceid('nt, days before nnd month~ before. 1 also wi~h to ehow thllt on
oecasiullE in e.ourt. he has been arrestE'd twice for drunk driving. onee
for drunkf'nness. and once for dronk and disorderly conduct withinsince the year 1934-here in this city. . . .
"Mr. Hervey: Well. we will object to any evidclIc.e of his beillg
arrested for misdemeanors, and we would also object to any . . .
attempt to impeaeh bim on nn immaterial matter, whetber he on other
unrelllted oceasions drank, wheth('r to excess or otherwise.
,. Mr. Bledsoe: J might ~lIy that we would alsn offl'r "ddence that
he pled [sic] guilty to thos(' ('hnrg('~ whieh were filed.
"The Court: . . . 1 am not eonviueed that the olIer of proof ••. is
proper . . . We will reserve that matter for argument."
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of plaintiff. It is apparent from colloquies of defendants'
counsel with the trial court and from their briefs that their
asserted desjre to inquire into plaintiff's identity and the
fact of his marriage was actually a desire to discredit plaintiff in an improper manner. Their real complaint is that they
were not permitted to show that Stickel had used other names
and bad been arrested on various charges and convicted of
misdemeanors under such other names. Such evidence was
not admissible. (People v. Arlington (1899), 123 Cal. 356,
357 [55 P. 1003] ; People v. Mohr (1910), 157 Cal. 732, 734
[109 P. 476) ; People v. Fleming (1913), 166 Cal. 357, 380
[136 P. 291, Ann.Cas. 1915B 881] ; People v. Williams (1925),
72 Cal.App. 52, 55 [236 P. 355]; People v. Adams (1926),
76 Cal.App. 178, 184-185 [244 P. 106].)
[7] On cross-examination of a police officer who had testified to the above mentioned admission of Amos that he did
not see the pickup truck, defendants sougbt to show that at
the scene of the accident the officer made in his notebook the
notation, "Cause of accident: Auto ran througb stop sign."
The trial court properly sustained an objection to sueh evidence on the ground that the notation was but an opinion
of the officer arrived at after be had interviewed unidentified
persons at the scene of the accident. [8] Defendants now assert that the notation was a record of a statement made by
Amos and was, therefore, admissible to impeach the officer.
The record does not support this assertion; on the contrary
defendants' counsel stated to the trial court that by evidence of
such notation "I want to show at the time, before Mr. Amos
said anything, that he [the officer] put down the cause of the
accident. " (Italics added.)
[9] Defendants asscrt that they were improperly curtailed
in their examination of their witness Lindamood. The record
reveals that after objections to several leading questions had
been sustained and several answers of the witness which were
not responsive or not statements of fact had been stricken,
defendants abandoned the line of inquiry which they now
claim was foreclosed by the court. Defendants ceased their
attempts to elicit the testimony even though plaintiff's counsel
stated that he had no objection thereto.
{10] Defendants complain both because a written statement of Linuamood, made three days before the trial, was
llo1 received in evidence when ofl'ered by defendants for the
purpose (not stated to the trial court) of rehabilitating Lin-
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damood after his cross-examination and because such statement was subsequently received when it was offered by plaintiff "for impeachment." The statement has no impeaching
effect (see Froeming v. Stockton Electric R. R. Co. (1915),
171 Cal. 401, 408-411 [153 P. 712, Ann.Cas. 1918B 408]).
But defendants have no ground to complain of its admission since their counsel said, when it was offered by plaintiff,
that he had no objection to its receipt. [11] And defendants
have no ground to complain of the original refusal to admit
the statement, because its rehabilitory effect, if any, was the
same whatever the stated purpose for which it was offered in
evidence by plaintiff.
Defendants assert that the trial court, over objection, permitted plaintiff's counsel deliberately to misread a question
and answer from a deposition of defendant Amos during his
cross-examination of Amos and refused to permit Amos to
explain "discrepancies" between such answer in the deposition and his testimony at the trial. The record shows that
plaintiff's counsel correctly read the question and answer,
that there were no "discrepancies" between the answer as
read and Amos' testimony, and that explanation of the answer
was made on Amos' redirect examination.
[12] Defendants contend that the italicized portions of
the following instruction are erroneous: "A person who,
himself, is exercising ordinary care, has a right to assume
that others, too. will perform their duty under the law, and
he has a further right to rely and act on that assumption.
Thus, it is not negligence for such a person to fail to anticipate injury which can come to him only from a violation
of law or duty by another. However, an exception should be
noied: The rights just d(>filled do not exist when it is reasonably
apparent to one, or in the exercise. of ordinary care would be
apparent to him, that another is not going to perform his duty.
[One is not justified in ignoring obvious danger although it is
created by another's miscolluuct, nor is he ever excused from
exercising ordinary care.]" (Cal. Jury Instructions, Civil
[B.A.J.L, 1943 ed.], Instruction 138. Italics defendants'.)
According to defendants. thp italicized portions of the instruction might be misunderstood to impose a duty to anticipate negligence on the part of others. The so-called "exception" does not impose snrh a duty. It is but a statement as
to that common type of negli:,!'(>nce, the unreasonable failure
to observe what is going on about one, including the negli-
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g<'nce of others. "One may not continue to assume that the
law is being observed after knowing or haying an opportunity, by the u;;e of rcasonabl<.' ('are, to know that it is not being
observed." (Edlund v. Los Angeles Ry. Co. (1936), 14 Cal.
App.2d 673,675 [58 P.2d 928].)
[13] Defendants further complain of an instruction that
"It is the duty of the driver or operator of any kind of vehicle
using a public highway to exercise ordinary care at all times
to avoid placing himself or others in danger and to avoid Ii
collision." (Cal. Jury Instructions, Civil [B.A.J .1., 1943 ed.],
InstructIOn 13S-A.) They argue that the instruction might
he misunderstood to impose the absolute duty "to avoid a
collision"; that the jury might believe that the qualifying
words, "to exercise ordinary care," relate only to the duty
"to avoid placing himself or others in danger" and not to
the duty "to avoid a collision." The instruction is subject to
such possible construction and, therefore, to criticism. (See
.Anderson v. Freis (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d 159, 164-165 [142
P.2d 330].) However, the jury did not so understand it for by
their yerdict for plaintiff (who, they were instructed, could not
recover if they found that Mrs. Stickel was negligent and that
such negligence contributed to cause the collision) they impliedly found that. although Mrs. Stickel did not "avoid a
collision," she was not guilty of negligence proximately contributing to canse snch collision.
[14] The court refused an instruction, proposed by defendants, to the effect that if Mrs. Stickel was intoxicated
Ilnd such intoxication was a proximate cause of the accident,
and plaintiff knew or should have known of such intoxication,
then his riding with her constituted negligence, and he cannot recover. Defendants complain that the refusal of this instruction deprived them of consideration of their pleaded
affirmative defense that plaintiff was himself contributively
negligent. But the refusal could not have prejudiced defendants. Plaintiff could not have been found contributively negligent in riding with a driver who, as the jury impliedly found
(since, having been instructed that negligence of Mrs. Stickel
was imputed to plaintiff, they found for plaintiff), was not
herself le~ally responsible for causing sHch collision.
[15] Deft'Duauts complain becaw~l: the trial court refused
to give tbe following instructioll requesteu by them: "It is
immaterial ",hi('11 vehiele ('uters the inter::;ection first. The
"ehicle l'lltcriug 01' crossing a through highway has no pref-

I
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.erence or is given no right of way over a vehiclc traveling
on a through highway merely becausc the vehicle crossing
or entering tlw through highway might have entered the intersection first." The first sentencc of the proposed instruction, standing alone, is manifestly erroneous. The relative
positions of the vehicles before they collided are of course
material where the negligence of the respective drivers is in
issue. The jury were correctly instructed as to the respective
rights and duties of drivers traveling on and across a through
highway; it was not suggested that one crossing such a highway might have the right of way "merely because ... [he]
might have entered the intersection first" ; and the trial court
correctly refused to distract the jury by giving the unnecessary instruction.
[16] The trial court refused the following instruction proposed by defendants: ., The lawful speed limit for a bus or
vehicle traveling south on 12th Street at the place where it
intersects with •K' Street is and was at the time of the accident 25 miles per hour, unless, it has been clearly proven
that such speed of 25 miles per hour was greater than was
reasonable or prudent for a person operating a vehicle on
12th Street in a southerly direction at the time and place of
the accident, having due regard for the traffic on, and the
surface and width of the highway, and the fact that 12th
Street at the time and pla<:e of the accident was an arterial,
or through highway, but in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property." This instruction
is an incomplete, misleading, and grammatically peculiar
attempt to state the codified speed laws which applied to the
bus. (Veh. Code, § 510 [basic speed law], § 511 [prima facie
speed limits], § 513 [proof of speed in excess of prima facie
limit does not establish negligence as a matter of law].)
[17] Defendants argue that they were prejudiced because the
jury were not told of the speed limit of 25 miles an hour. But
25 miles an hour was the "prima facie'" not, as stated in
the proposed instruction, the "lawful" speed limit. Nor does
it appear that the jury would have been aided in their delib·
eration or probably would have reached n different result if
the trial court had corrected the instruction and informed
them of the "prima facie" speed limit, for whether defendant
Amos was or was not exceeding such limit would not, under
the circumstances ~own, answer the question whether he was
negligent.
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[18] Defendants nrgt' that the Irial (~()urt erred in refusing the following requ(>sted instruction: .. Section 501 of the
Vehie1e Code ... read, in part, as follows: 'Any person wbo.
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drives a
vehicle and when so driving does any act forbidden by law
or neglects any duty imposed by law in the driving of such
vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury
to any person, is guilty of a felony.'
"Section 502 of the Vehicle Code . . . read, in part, as follows: 'It is unlawful for any person who is under the inftuence
of intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle upon any highway.'
"If you should find from the evidence that the decedent,
Essie Stickel, conducted herself in violation of Section 501
or 502 of the Vehicle Code ..., you are instructed that such
conduct constituted negligence as a matter of law, and if you
further find that such violation of law by Essi(> Stickel contributed in some degree as a proximate cause of the accident,
the plaintiffs cannot recover and your verdict must be for the
defendants. "
The refusal to instruct as to the criminal responsibility
of an intoxicated driver was correct. (See Greening v. Ford
(1932),127 Cal.App. 462 (16 P.2d 143], where, after injection
into a civil action of the question of criminal responsibility,
the jury brought in a verdict of .. for the defendant Not
Guilty"; on this ground a new trial was granted.) [19] An
instruction specifically directed to drunken driving as negligence could have been given but, in the circumstances, the
failure of the court to modify and give defendants' proposed
instruction does not appear to have prejudiced them. The
jury were adequately instructed in general terms as to negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause. To
assume that they did not consider the question of Mrs. Stickel's asserted intoxication under these general instructions
would be to attribute to the jury a lack of ordinary intelligence or deliberate violation of duty.
Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that other instructions requested by them are not fully covered by the
instructions given.
Defendants assert that the manner in which plaintiff's
counsel cross-examined certain of defendants' witnesses
amounted to prejudicial misconduct. Surh cross·examination
was searching and even rigorous but we cannot agree tha\
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it was conducted in a manner which prejudiced defendants'
substantial rights.
[20] On motion for new trial defendants presented three
affidavits which, they claim, show misconduct on the part of
two jurors; i. e., that such jurors made certain personal investigations which influenced the verdict. Two of the affidavits, by an employe of defendant company whose capacity
is not averred. are upon information and belief. The third,
by a bus operator of defendant company, concerns the conduct of "a gray-haired woman of about fifty years of age
wearing a gray suit and hat [who] informed affiant that she
was a juror then hearing a 'death case' "; it is not shown that
this woman wa.-; a juror in the present case. Therefore. the
affidavitR were insufficif'llt for thf' purpose for which they
were offered. (People v. Pindley (1901), 132 Csl. 301, 308
[64 P. 472] ; Gay v. Torrance (1904),145 Cal. 144,152 [78 P.
540] ; Kimic v. San .lose-Los Gatos etc. Ry. Co. (1909), 156
Cal. 379, 396 [104 P. 986].)
Dl·fendants' contention that the evidence shows an amount
of damages less than that awardcd for medical expenses.
etc .• cannot be considered since they stipulated "that defendants will present no question on said appcal concerning the
amount or the excessiveness of the damages."
For the reasons above stated the judgment and order
appealed from are affirmed. Defendants' purported appeal
from the verdict is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
TRA YNOR, J .-1 dissent.
In my opinion the "erdict is not supported by the evidence.
The bus driver proceeding on a through highway had the
right to assume that Mrs. Stickel would yield the right of
way. (Veh. Code. § 552; Ambra v. Woolsey, 55 Cal.App.2d
104. lOG [130 P.2d 152); Zwcr·in v. Riverside Cement Co.,
52 Cal. A pp2d 715. 7]8-719 [126 P.2d 920]; Gritsclt v. Picku,iclo Stages System, 131 Cal.App. 774. 780 122 P.2d 554];
ll1lJlI!JI' v. McCall. 35 Cal.App.2d 634. (i3S Inn P.2d aSGI;
Ril,'(/ \". ill arkef Streff R.I!. Co .• 50 Cal.App.2d 79(i. 800 1123
P.2d 904); s~e LindrlliJall"lll v. 8m'hour, 2]3 Cal. 277. 28528{j 12 P.2d ]61]). I find nothill!(" in the evi(l('JH'1' from wldeh
an illferen('e ('ould be drawn that the bus was not so close
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to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard and
therefore cannot agree that Mrs. Stickel could rcasonably
believe that there was not such a hazard.
Even if it is assumed that the jury could determine that
the bus driver was negligent when he entered the intersection,
Mrs. Stickel was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, if she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
while driving the t.ruck, and the trial court's refusal to give
defendants' instruction to that. effect was prejudicial error.
Defendants called several witnesses, who testified that Mr.
and Mrs. Stickel were intoxicated on the evening of the collision, which occurred at about 10 :40 p. m. Harry Walker
testified that he was on duty as bartender at the Last
R-oundup Cafe at Encanto on that evening; that the Stickels
entered the bar sometime between 9 and 10 p. m.; that they
came directly to the bar and asked for a drink; that Mrs.
Stickel "was hilarious and in a happy fralDe of mind and a
little bit on the staggering side"; that he therefore refused
to serve her liquor aud instructed the waitresses not to serve
her; that Mrs. Stickel said "she would get a drink anyway"
and mingled with other custolDers; and that the Stickels )('ft
the bar 20 or 30 minutes after their arrival. Leon Cesmat
testified that he was employed at the Last Roundup Cafe and
that his duties included keeping order in the cafe; that on
the night of the accident between 9 and 10 p. m. he saw Mrs.
Stickel in the cafe talking to two sailors; that Mrs. Stickel
was "pretty well intoxicated" and that he ordered her out
upon instructions of the proprietress. Sandra Slayton testified that she was part owner and manager of the Last Roundup
Cafe; that on the night of the accident she saw the Stickels
at the cafe shortly before 10 p. m.; that Mrs. Stickel was
intoxicated; that Mr. Stickel's condition "wasn't 80 bad";
that Mrs. Stickel "was walking from table to table picking
up drinks and drinking them"; that Mrs. Stickel did not
lcaye the cafe when the witness asked her to and that she
therefore asked the doorman to make her leave. George F.
Evans testified that he went with an ambulance to the scene
of the accident in line of duty as a police officer; that there
was a slight odor of alcohol at the scene of the accident, and
a more noticeable one in the ambulance; and that he smelled
alcobol on Mrs. Stickel's breath. Harry Kemp, another police
officer, testified that he drove the ambulance to the hospital
while Evans sat in the back with the Stickels; that he helped
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carry them out of the ambulance and at that time smelled
alcohol on both of them.
'fhe trial court refused to give the following instruction
requested by defendants:
"Section 501 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California
in force and effect at the time of the accident reads, in part,
as follows: 'Any person who, while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, drives a vehicle and when so driving does
any act forbidden by law or neglets any duty imposed by law
in the driving of such vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any person, is guilty of a felony . . .' Section 502 of the Vehicle Code of the State of
California in force and effect at the time of the accident reads,
in part, as follows: 'It is unlawful for any person who is under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle upon
any highway.' If you should find from the evidence that the
decedent, Essie Stickel, conducted herself in violation of Section 501 or 502 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California,
just read to you, you are instructed that such conduct constituted negligence as a matter of law, and if you further find
that such violation of law by Essie Stickel contributed in
some degree as a proximate cause to the accident, the plaintiffs
cannot recover and your verdict must be for the defendant,s.".
The majority opinion holds that the failure to give this
instruction could not have prejudiced defendants, on the
grounds that the jury were adequately instructed in general
terms as to negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate
cause, and that they impliedly found that Mrs. Stickel was
not legally responsible for causing the collision. "To assume
that they did not consider the question of Mrs. Stickel's
asserted intoxication under these general instructions would
be to attribute to the jury a lack of ordinary intelligence or
deliberate violation of duty."
Although the jury may have considered the question of Mrs.
Stickel's alleged intoxication, they were not instructed as to
the legal effect of such intoxication on her responsibility for
the accident. The genera] instructions left them free to formu-

/
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·Section 501 is violated by anyone who engages in negligent conduct
in addition to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, but such driving is in itself a volo.tion of section 502.
Reference to section 501 was therefore superfluous, but it WtLS 1I0t
erroneous. If the jury had found that Mrs. Stickel violated section
502, they would necessarily have deternlined that plaintiffs could not
recover, and it would be lDlmaterial whether she also violated seetio.
501.
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late their own stanJunl of (·nJIIII ... , and to approve' "01111111'1 I hill
the Legislature has declared xo IlHzHrdous as to "all f()J" I'rill1inal punishment. 'I'hey were bounJ to concluul' from these
instructions that Mrx. Sti,:kcl's alleged intoxication was only
one circumstance to be consiuered ill determining whether her
conduct contributed to the injuries complaineu of. In the
absence of a statute like section 502 such instructions might
haye been adequate. (Coakley v. Ajuria, 209 Cal. 745, 752
l290 P. 33] ; Emery v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 61 Cal.App.2d
455.461 [143 P.2d 112] ; see 4 Sherman & Redfield on Negligence (rev. -ed.), § 700.) Section 502, however, prohibits
persolls from engaging in the ultrahazardous activity of driving a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, thereby setting a statutory standard of
conduct. If that standard is applicable, a violation thereof
constitutes negligence as a matter of law. "An act or failure
to act below the statutory standard is negligence per se, or
negligence as a matter of law." (Satterlee v. Orange Glenn
School Dlstrict,t 29 Cal.2d 581, 588 [177 P.2d 279], and cases
there cited.) In determining whether the statutory standard
is applicable, the court must determine whether the persons
injured were within a class that the statute was designeJ to
protect, and whether the injury arose from a hazard of the
kind the statute was designed to guard against. (De Haen v.
Rocl.:wood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350 [179 N.E. 764] ; Restatement, Torts, § 286; Prosser, Torts, 269.)
Mr. and Mrs. Stickel as users of the highway were clearly
within the class of persons for whose protection section 502
of the Vehicle Code was enacted. It is likewise clear that their
injuries arose from a type of hazard against which the statute
is directed. In Johnston v. Brewer, 40 Cal.App.2d 583, 587
[105 P.2d 365]. it was held that the jury was correctly instructed that a pedestrian, who was struck by an automobile,
.. was guilty of negligence as a matter of law" in being on a
street or highway while intoxicated in violation of a municipal
ordinance. "It is common knowledge that one whose senses
have been dulled by intoxicants is Ullable to control his bodily
movements in a normal manner and as a result the presence
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t.The lIohling in the majority opinion in that ease that the jury can
determine from the evidence whetller deviation from a statutory stand
ard ill excused hy the extraordinary circumstances of a particular case
is not involved in the present case. 'fllere is no evidence of any justi·
fication for Mrs Stickel's driving the autolllouile while under til ..
influl'llce of iutoxicatini liquor.
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of such persons upon the public stre('ts and highways is danger.
ous not only to themst'lves but to others who are lawfully using
the strcets and highways. It is evidrnt that the ordinan('(' was
enacted in the interests of the gelleral welfare for the dual
purpose of protecting intoxicated persons from the results
of their own folly and of protecting the general public from
the dangers alld other evils attenuant upon the presence of
such persons upon tIle streets and highways . . . " Certainly
the statute involved in this case has the same purpose, for the
dangers attendant upon the presence of an intoxicated person
on a highway, particularly at an intersection, are multiplied if
he is operating a motor vehicle. (Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho
427 [262 P. 881, 56 A.L.R. 317] ; Wise v. Schneider, 205 Ala.
537 [88 So. 662J; Lincoln Taxl:cab Co. v. Smith, 88 Misc. 9
[150 N.Y.S. 86].)
Section 502, however, does not deprive an intoxicated driver
of all protection against the wrongful act of another. If the
disabilities of the driver arising from intoxication, such as
impairment of his percepton and his reactions to the dangers
of th(' road, did not expose him to a foreseeable risk of injury
through such a wrongful act, section 502 does not govern
llis civil responsibilities. Certainly in the present case, if Mrs.
Stickel was intoxicated, the consequent impairment of her drh··
ing ability exposed her to a foreseeable risk of injury throu{Ch
the negligence of defcndants' bus driver. It cannot reasonably
be said that the possibility that other vehicles approaching
011 the through highway would negligently enter the intersection was so remote that it could not be regarded as part of
the risk. Anyone operating a motor vehicle on a highway
must realize that he cannot drive blindly into an intersection
in the confidence that other vehicles will yield the right of
way. (Donat v. Dillon, 192 Cal. 426, 429 (221 P. 193] ; see
Prosser, Torts, 245 and cases there cited.) Clearly, if Mrs.
Stickel was intoxicated, her belief as to the chances she could
take cannot serve to jnstify her conduct. Whatever the extent of the right of a driver of a motor vehicle to assume that
others will use due care, an intoxicated driver, who has impaired his ability to appreciate the dangers of the road,
particularly of an intersection, is engaged in an ultrahazardous activity that necessarily involves a risk of serious harm
to himself as well as well as to others. A motor vehicle
operated by an intoxicated person is an instrument of death
and destruction, and it iR a matter of chance wIlen or whetller
an accident. will occur a11d to whom, and how serious it will be.
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Even if momentarily the operator's reactions are those of a
sober person, he is likely to revert to the erratic reactions of
those who are not. His momentary seizure of sober behaviour
may in itself be erratic and is certainly dangerous in lulling
others into believing that he has full possession of his senses.
Conduct involving undue risk of harm to one's self as well
as to others, including conduct prohibited by statute, constitutes contributory negligence. (Meincke v. Oakland Garage,
Inc., 11 Ca1.2d 255, 256 [79 P.2d 91] ; Koeppel v. Daluiso, 118
Cal.App. 442, 446 [5 P.2d 457]; see Restatement, Torts,
§§ 469, 475.)
It is contended, however, that the judgment must be affirmed
on the ground that the jury has impliedly found that Mrs.
Stickel was not legally responsible for causing the collision, in
other words, that her conduct was not a "proximate" cause
thereof. This contention may mean (1) that Mrs. Stickel's
conduct was not in fact a cause of the collision, or (2) that the
harm therefrom does not fall within the limits of her legal
responsibility for the consequenccs of her conduct. That her
driving the truck into the intersection was a substantial factor
in bringing about the collision and therefore in fact contributed to the accident there can be no doubt. (See Restatement, Torts, § 431.) With that dctermined, the question of
causation is settled. It remains only to dctermine whether the
injury falls within the limits of her responsibility for the consequences of her conduct. (See Prosser, Torts, pp. 311-313.)
In my opinion. that determination is made once it is established that her conduct was wrongful with respect to her own
safety and that of ot.hers on the highway; for the risk reasonably to be foreseen not only creates the responsibility but
defines its limits. (See concurring opinion in Mosley v. Ardrn li'arms Co., 26 Ca1.2d 213, 220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R.
8721, and authorities there cited.) A decision. therefore, that
Mrs. Stickel was not legally responsible for causing the collision or that her conduct was not the proximate cause thereof
meAns only that she was not negligent. If she was driying while
intoxicated. she was guilty of negligence as a matter of law,
and thc jury should have been so instructed.
Allprllants' petition for a rf'hl'aring was dl'nied July 29,
1948. a11<l opinion was modified to read as above. Trayuor, J.,
voted for a rehearing.

